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Large universal banks played a major role for Germany’s industrialisation because they 
provided loans to the industry and thereby helped firms to overcome liquidity 
constraints. Previous research has also argued that they were equally important on the 
German stock market. The present paper provides quantitative and qualitative evidence 
that although the market for underwriters was dominated by a small oligopoly of six 
large banks, there was still perceptible competition, which kept fees and short run 
profits low.  
Another interesting finding of the paper is the absence of a signalling effect to investors. 
Neither underpricing nor the one year performance was different for the IPOs issued by 
one of the Big Six. Thus, although the German IPO business was in the hands of a small 
oligopoly, investors did not benefit from the lack of competition. One explanation is 
that the quality of IPOs on the German stock market of the time was very good in 
general caused by the competition between underwriters, but also by the tight regulation 
of underwriting, which ensured the quality of all firms on the German stock market. 
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Introduction 
 
The classical view, associated with Gerschenkron, is that the peculiar character of 
Germany’s financial institutions played a critical role for her industrialisation and for 
the fact that Germany overtook England in the late 19th century.1 However, one main 
argument against this view is that banks only became influential after the 
industrialisation and their impact on the actual take off was therefore limited.2 
Moreover, a prominent study by Neuberger and Stokes provides empirical evidence that 
the influence of large credit banks on economic growth was indeed negative.3 The 
results of their analysis, too, have been disputed.4 More recent empirical research, based 
on better data and longer periods, provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
banks had a positive impact on industrialisation. Burhop, for instance, showed that total 
assets of credit banks were positively correlated with capital accumulation in the 
industrial sector until the mid-1880s.5 Compatible with this finding is his observation 
that up to the 1880s banks screened and monitored the market for loans. In the 1890 this 
influence diminished but an important signalling function remained.6  
                                                 
1 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, and Europe in the Russian Mirror. One reason is, for instance, 
the emergence of formal relationships between universal banks and nonfinancial firms, a typical feature 
of which was the appearance of bankers in supervisory boards of non-financial firms. In this way, banks 
acquired a high degree of control over industrial enterprises. They used the information to give long-term 
funding of potentially risky investments in high-growth, capital intensive industrial branches. See Tilly, 
German banking, 113-152. 
2 Edwards and Ogilivie,‘Universal banks’. Tilly claims for instance that private banks in the Rhineland 
already began to develop universal banking in the 1820s, that is, long before industrialisation got under 
way. Tilly, Financial Institutions. 
3 Neuberger and Stokes, ‘German Banks and German Growth’ 
4 See for instance Tilly and Fremdling, ‘German Banks, German Growth and Econometric History’ and 
Komlos, ‘The Kreditbanken’. 
5 The idea behind his approach is that banks could provide loans to the industry below market interest 
rates to support industrial growth. Then, in the moment of take-off, they could increase interest rates to 
balance the previous subsidy. A precondition of this strategy was a sufficient concentration of market 
power, which diminished in the 1870s when more banks entered the market.  Burhop, ‘Industrialisation’. 
6 Burhop, ‘Aufsichtsräte’. 
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In the late 19th century the stock market more and more replaced loans as a major source 
of capital for industrial firms7. The question is whether large banks could transfer their 
influence from the market for loans to the stock markets. According to Burhop there is 
no such evidence in the early phase of the stock market from 1870 to 1896.8  
This leads to a slight modification of Gerschenkron’s Hypothesis: Did the large German 
banks indeed shift their strong position from the market for loans to the stock market, 
(even if this became perceptible only after 1896), thereby still playing a critical role for 
firms to overcome liquidity constraints and thus for Germany’s industrialisation? And 
furthermore, did the fact that large banks underwrote issues have a positive signalling 
effect for investors? 
These questions will be tested based on a substantial amount of newly collected 
qualitative and quantitative evidence.9 In a famous article De Long points out that the 
USA and Germany had qualitatively superior capital markets than England, which were 
responsible for England falling behind. His main argument is that securities issues and 
investment banking business in the US and in Germany were concentrated in the hands 
of very few investment bankers and the investors benefited from the lack of 
competition.10 He argues that although J.P. Morgan, one of the biggest actors in the US, 
exploited their position by for instance charging high fees, the negatives of financial 
capitalism were outweighed by positives. The argument goes as follows: The market did 
                                                 
7 In 1913, the ratio of commercial and savings deposits divided by GDP was 0.53. See Rajan and Zingalis 
‘The great reversals’, p.14. 
8 Burhop, ‘Aufsichtsräte’ and Burhop, ‘Underpricing’. 
9 Qualitative information was taken from the Historical Archive Deutsche Bank (HADB), the Archive of 
Sal Oppenheim (a Cologne-based private bank) and the files of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, stored in 
the Bundesarchiv (BA).  The quantitative analysis is based on data from Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des 
Deutschen Reichs. According to an act of the German parliament from June 1896, all IPOs and SEOs had 
to be published in an official statistical record. The publication includes the date of the issue, the name of 
the firm, that of the underwriter, the offering price if existent and the size of the issue. For the present 
paper, these records have been used to compile a data set that includes detailed information about market 
shares for underwriter services, how they developed over time, and about the frequency of activity in the 
market for IPOs, their sizes and sectoral structure. 
10 De Long ‘Morgans’s men’, p.205. 
3 
 
discipline the Morgan partnership and other large banks in the long run. He reasons that 
Morgan and company were able to keep doing deals and charging high fees, because of 
their high reputation for good judgment and identifying firms with good performances. 
Preservation of this reputation was the primary goal of the partnership and kept it from 
abusing its short run market power by leading its clients into unsound deals.11 
Hannah has recently questioned De Longs point that underwriters with small market 
shares in a highly competitive market expect their future returns from a reputation as an 
honest broker to be small and that they therefore have a higher incentive to exploit the 
market for short run profits. He suggest that this - unrealistically - implies that London 
Bankers did not care for their long-run reputation as issuers, and that British Business 
owners were dissuaded from IPOs by London’s competitive and therefore cheap 
financial intermediation.12  
What does this imply for the German IPO market? According to De Long's argument, 
large banks and investors would have benefited from a lack of competition, since the 
market was dominated by a bank monopoly or a bank cartel, which would have had an 
incentive to signal high quality issues in order to keep their reputation in the long run. 
The first section of the paper provides qualitative and quantitative evidence that large 
prestigious banks were indeed important in the process of going public on the German 
stock market in the period from 1896 to 1913. However, in contrast to the US, the 
German stock market was not monopolised by one bank or a banking cartel. There was 
a small oligopoly at the top of the market, which consisted of the six banks that had 
                                                 
11 Ibis. p. 232,233. 
12 He further supports his view by showing that De Longs analysis lacks convincing statistical evidence – 
of which De Long himself admits in his paper the conceptual inadequacy and insignificance.  Hannah, 
‘J.P Morgan. P. 142. 
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equity capital exceeding 100 Million Marks13: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, 
Diskontogesellschaft, Darmstädter Bank (the “D-banks”), A. Schaaffhausenscher 
Bankverein and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft.14 Except for A. Schaaffhausenscher 
Bankverein, by the beginning of the observed time period they all had their headquarters 
in Berlin.15 The five largest of them also formed interest groups with other banks, either 
through share holdings (the large banks simply owned parts of smaller banks), or 
through contracts, which will also be considered.16   
The six largest banks, however, did not seem to operate as a cartel. Evidence provided 
in section 3 to 5 suggest that there was perceptible competition between them. 
If De Long is right and investors in the US got a fair deal, the initial returns were 
high to the disadvantage of owners of firms, who were in addition charged with high 
fees. Thus the incentive for firms to go public at the US stock exchange must have been 
limited - which it was as indicated by the relatively low number of firms going public in 
the US.17 If banks in Germany had acted similarly, we would observe substantial 
underpricing and high fees on German stock markets as well. However, as shown in 
section two, underpricing was low. Furthermore we also would observe high fees for 
firms going public, which we also cannot find conclusive evidence for (section three). 
Thus, while in the US the firm owners were the losers of the process, in Germany the 
competition in the oligopoly kept underpricing and fees low. Thus, while firm owners 
seemed to get fair deals, investors might have been the losers of this system. This is 
                                                 
13 Market capitalization is often used to measure reputation in a modern setting, see Michaely and Shaw, 
‘The pricing’. 
14 Riesser, Die Deutschen Großbanken,  pp. 519. 
15 Darmstädter Bank was founded in Darmstadt, Dresdner Bank in Dresden, and A. Schaffhausenscher 
Bankverein in Cologne. However, early after the foundation of the Reich they opened branches in Berlin 
(Damstädter Bank in 1871, Dresdner Bank in 1884 and A. Schaffhausenscher Bankverein in 1891) and 
moved their headquarter in the following years from their traditional places towards Berlin. A. 
Schaffhausen’scher Bankverein, however,  kept the headquarter in Cologne, although the Berlin branch 
became more influential over time.  See Riesser, Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte, p 242.  
16 See Riesser, Die deutschen Großbanken, pp. 520. 
17 Hannah ‘Global equity markets in 1900’ 
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further supported by the absence of a signalling effect: Neither the initial returns were 
higher for IPOs issued by large prestigious banks nor did they perform better than IPOs 
issued by smaller banks in a one year period. 
The strong and fast development of the German stock markets, however, implicitly 
provides evidence that investors still had incentives to invest- although short run profits 
were marginal. The quality of IPOs on the German stock market of the time might have 
been very good in general caused by the competition between underwriters, who all 
tried to build up a good reputation by carefully choosing promising firms and reject to 
underwrite less promising ones, but also – and this seems the most likely - by the tight 
regulation of underwriting, which ensured the quality of all firms on the German stock 
market.18 
 
The IPO business and the importance of firm-bank 
relationships 
The German stock market law of 1897 regulated the criteria a firm had to fulfil in order 
to go public. First, a firm had to be a joint stock company. Firms that got listed could 
therefore either be newly incorporated, or they were transformed into a joint stock 
company, if they had already existed in another corporate structure before.19 Thus, 
during the process of being listed, they had to reveal their financial standing and other 
general features twice: once before they got incorporated and once before they went 
public.20  
                                                 
18 Burhop, Chambers and Cheffins, ‘Regulation’. 
19 For different types of corporate forms see Guinnane, Harris, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, ‘Corporation’. 
20 See §§ 186, 191, 193, Handelsgesetzbuch des Deutschen Reichs 1897. 
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After a firm’s foundation or transformation, its information was checked by an 
independent expert, and after it had passed this check-up, it had to be officially 
registered in the commercial register.21 
In order to go public, the firm itself, or a bank on behalf of the firm, had to apply to the 
exchange admission board. In this process, it had to publish a prospectus, where all 
information needed to evaluate the issue was made available to possible investors. The 
exchange admission board was responsible for making sure that all possible investors 
received the information they needed and for keeping firms off the stock market that 
“might harm potential investors”. In case the board rejected the admission of a firm, 
they did not need to justify their decision.22 Thus we do not know their criteria for 
excluding firms from the stock market. 
Furthermore, newly incorporated firms as well as transformed firms could not be listed 
at a stock market during the first year after incorporation. They had to publish the 
balance sheet and a profit and loss statement of their first year as a joint stock company 
first. In exceptional cases, this retention period of one year could be dispensed by the 
provincial government of the state where the stock market was located.23   
Between 1897 and 1913, a large number of banks were actively involved in 
underwriters’ services. Most of them only appeared once or twice, others organised 
IPOs for only one firm. Here, we often find prestigious private banks such as for 
instance Arnold, Abel, Bleichröder, Cahn, Dreyfuss and Rothschild. Still, the stock 
market was dominated by a small number of banks. Figure 1 shows a curve that 
visualises market concentration on the market of IPOs over the whole period calculated 
by the quantity of IPOs and the share in value for Berlin and all stock markets, 
                                                 
21 See §§ 195, 199, 200, Handelsgesetzbuch des Deutschen Reichs 1897. 
22 §§ 36, 38, 41, Deutsches Börsengesetz 1896. 
23 §§ 39, Deutsches Börsengesetz 1896, see also Moral, Aktienkapital, pp. 1. 
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separately. In terms of quantity, 10 percent of the banks held about 50 percent of the 
market share of completed numbers of IPOs. Concentration was even stronger if we 
consider the market shares in size. Here, 10 percent of banks held about 70 percent of 
the stock market.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Table 1 provides the market shares in numbers of completed IPOs in the period between 
1898 and 1913 and in four sub-periods.24  
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Diskontogesellschaft, Darmstädter Bank, Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft and A. Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein were not just the six largest 
banks according to their capitalisation; they were also the ones with the highest market 
share in the size of IPOs - a small oligopoly at the top of the market. Their overall 
market share in the number of IPOs reached 30 and even 40 percent if we measure the 
market share on the total size of IPOs. If we also include their groups - i.e. the banks 
with which they were closely linked through contracts or investment -, the overall 
market share in the number of IPOs reaches 37 percent and even 59 percent of the size. 
The market leader was Deutsche Bank. This bank had an overall market share in the 
number of completed IPOs of 9 percent. This rather low share is deceiving. Its market 
share of the size of IPOs was 18.8 percent over the whole period. Furthermore it 
strongly increased its market share by volume over the observed period: starting with 
12.7 percent in the period from 1898 to 1901, the bank nearly tripled its market share to 
29.6 percent from 1910 to 1913.  
                                                 
24 In order to be able to split the sample in four equally sized four-year periods, I exclude the year 1897 in 
this table and in all following tables were the sample is split into sub-periods. 
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The most important and largest stock exchange in Berlin was clearly dominated by the 
oligopoly of the Big Six. The regional stock exchanges, however also show regional 
banks at the top of the market: The stock exchange in Frankfurt for instance was 
dominated by an oligopoly of Pfälzische Bank, Deutsche Vereinsbank, Darmstädter 
Bank and Deutsche Effekten- und Wechselbank. The Cologne stock exchange was 
dominated by the A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein and Sal Oppenheim, a prestigious, 
private banking house based in Cologne. Thus in contrast to the US, where J.P. Morgan 
clearly dominated the market25, a clear market leader was absent in Germany.  
So far the modified Gerschenkron Hypothesis seems to be true and large banks 
shifted their influence on capital access from the market for loans to the stock market. 
They dominated the stock market and even increased their impact over time, altogether 
reaching up to 78.8 percent of the overall size in IPOs from 1906 to 1909.  
However, the Herfindahl index, which is calculated as the sum of squared 
markets shares (treating all banks separately), only reaches a maximum size of 0.15 in 
1906 to 1909. The measure ranks from 0 to 1. Although sizes of 1 hardly ever appear, 
0.15 is still relatively low, considering that a size of about 0.3 is treated as an effective 
monopoly in banking for modern markets.26 An average size of 0.08 indicates that the 
large banks were still competing with each other. However, there was a clear tendency 
towards further concentration: The Herfindahl index doubled in the period of 16 years.27 
Still, assuming the banks did not operate as a cartel and thus treating their market shares 
separately, competition was still perceptible.  
 
                                                 
25 De Long ‘Morgans’s men’. 
26 Daskin and Wolken, ’Critical Herfindal index‘. 
27 One can find a beginning concentration in earlier years, but it is much extended in this period. See 
Lehmann, ‘Die Bedeutung der Emissionsbanken’. 
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(Table 1 about here) 
 
Furthermore, the market shares were calculated by lead underwriter as indicated 
in the “Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches”, but this underestimates 
the influence of smaller or regional banks: Owners of firms, who wanted to go public, 
usually first consulted their “house bank” or another local bank. In most cases, as shown 
below, this bank did not act as the lead underwriter in the end. In fact this bank mostly 
not even signed the issue prospectus and did thus not appear in the official statistical 
record, the “Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches”, on whose data base 
the current paper relies. Rather the “house bank” approached one of the large banks that 
had a branch at the place of the envisaged stock market, which then acted as the lead 
and official underwriter.28 The reason was that only banks, which appeared in the issue 
prospectus, were liable for the IPO. Sometimes this was only one bank and sometimes it 
was a number of banks who shared the risk and acted in most cases within a consortium. 
Duties and responsibilities, the distribution of risk and profits and other related facts 
within the consortium were fixed within a contract.29 The available qualitative evidence 
taken from correspondences between firms, local banks and large banks and the 
literature of the time suggest there were recurring features regarding the role of large 
banks and their reputation in the issuing process:  
First, local banks started negotiations with large reputable banks by distinctly 
stating their wish to get the shares placed well at the stock market. Both the “house 
bank” and the large bank often explicitly stated that the house bank needed the 
                                                 
28 The only exceptions are cross listings. In 1906 for instance the private Bank Bernhard Loose in Berlin 
was the lead underwriter of Bremer-Vegesacker Fischereigesellschaft at the Berlin stock exchange and 
Mannheim stock exchange (Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 1906, I. pp. 268) 
29 See for instance Pohl, ‘die Blütezeit der Konsortien‘, and Riesser, Grossbanken pp. 326 
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reputation of the large bank in order to place the shares. For instance, in the case of the 
IPO of “Friedrich Thörls Vereinigte Harburger Ölfabriken” (“F.T. United Harburg Oil 
Works”), Friedrich Thörl, the owner, went to his “house bank”, the Harburg branch of 
Hannoversche Bank, in early 1906 to transform his firm into an incorporated stock 
company and after the restricted period of one year go public at the Berlin stock 
exchange. Hannoversche Bank then approached Deutsche Bank in order to sell the 
shares in Berlin.30 Local banks often did not have the size, connections or branches at 
the stock exchanges and could thus not organise the IPO of their customers themselves. 
With good relationships to large underwriters in Berlin, however, they could still 
participate in the process of the IPO and thus make substantial profits with the IPO 
without facing the risk of high losses trough liabilities or being completely excluded 
from the process. Thus, in order to stay in the business local banks had an interest in 
establishing business connections with large prestigious banks. This necessity of large 
banks in the process of placing shares is further supported by the fact that Hannoversche 
Bank approached Deutsche Bank, although they were well aware of the risk to lose 
Friedrich Thörl as an important customer to Deutsche Bank. In a letter from the local 
branch to the head office of Hannoversche Bank, the branch manager mentioned that he 
was well aware of this possibility, showing his interest in preserving the current state of 
the customer relationship: “Our aim must be to ensure that nobody gets in here and that 
we maintain constant influence.”31  
Second, firm owners also seem to have been well aware that choosing the right 
lead underwriter was very important to place the shares. Although firms often did not 
directly approach the largest banks in the first place, the owner of a firm often directly 
                                                 
30 Letter Hannoversche Bank branch Harburg to Deutsche Bank Berlin 13 April 1906 (HADB K16/123. 
31 Letter Hannoversche Bank branch Harburg to Hannoversche Bank head office 21 April 1906 (HADB 
K16/123): „Unser Streben muß daher darauf gerichtet sein, niemand anders hineinkommen zu lassen und 
ständigen Einfluss zu behalten.“ 
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addressed that he chose the particular local bank because of its well known business 
connections with the large banks. For example, the owner of “Farbwerke Rasquin” 
(Rasquin Colour Works), a firm that went public in 1912, approached Sal Oppenheim, a 
local private bank, in an official letter, asking if they would provide support for going 
public at the Berlin stock exchange by using their good relationship with the large bank 
in Berlin (meant was the Discontogesellschaft, which was the lead underwriter later) 32  
 
Large Banks, short run profits and short run signalling  
The question now arises whether large banks exploited their position to extract 
extraordinary short run profits and whether investors got “fair deals”. 
One possibility to extract profits from the IPO business was charging high underwriting 
fees. We do not have a clear picture about how large the underwriting fee actually was, 
since the fee was negotiated individually and in most cases this information is missing. 
Thus we can only assume that it varied across underwriters and firms depending on 
individual negotiation power. For the cases where we have the information, the fees 
were independent of the actual size of the issued shares. This suggests that they were 
intended to cover the cost of the issuing process (prospect, stock market fee, taxes etc.). 
For the IPO of Farbwerke Rasquin for instance, the Diskontogesellschaft charged a 
fixed fee of 50,000 Marks for issuing shares of 1.5 Mill Marks (3,3 percent) and another 
variable 1/8 percent on the market size of the sold shares.33 In the case of the IPO of 
Hubertus Braunkohlen, Deutsche Bank charged the same fixed fee of 50.000 Marks for 
issuing shares of only 250.000 Marks. There is a note that out of this amount, they paid 
                                                 
32 Letter Rasquin to Sal Oppenheim 9 November 1910 Sal. Oppenheim jun. & Cie. File ’Farbwerke 
Rasquin’. 
33 Sal. Oppenheim jun. & Cie. File "Farbwerke Rasquin". 
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the cost for the introduction at the Berlin stock exchange and the inspection of the 
Deutsche Treuhand, an accounting firms34 and shared the remaining amount with Sal 
Oppenheim – the local bank.35 In the case of Amme, Giesecke & Konegen, Deutsche 
Bank charged a fixed amount of 25.000 for issuing shares of 4 Mill. Marks.36  
We have only very few cases, which cannot provide sufficient evidence to conclude that 
large banks charged exploiting fees. From the very few cases, however, we cannot draw 
the conclusion that this was the case. The fees in these cases was relatively fix around 
50.000 Marks and according to the notes intended to cover the actual costs of going 
public.  
According to Moral, a contemporary observer, the primary interest of the large banks to 
underwrite an IPO lay in the desire to establish long term business relationships with 
industrial firms.37 Long term business relationships had two positive effects: The banks 
would get to manage the banking business of these firms, and furthermore gain detailed 
information about these firms and their businesses, which might be valuable for future 
business with similar firms or interesting to other potential business partners. Long term 
business relationships were often already part of the contract regarding the IPO. In the 
case of the IPO of Farbwerke Rasquin, Sal Oppenheim mentioned in a letter to the 
owner if the firm had a bank account in Berlin, this would have to be transferred to the 
Diskontogesellschaft, the lead underwriter.38  
Nevertheless, large banks certainly made substantial profits as underwriters, selling 
shares which they bought from the original owners of the firms on the stock exchange, 
                                                 
34 See also p.24. 
35 Letter Sal Oppenheim to Deutsche Bank 18. March 1910 and Letter Deutsche Bank to Sal Oppenheim 
19. March 1910. Sal. Openheim jun. & Cie. File „Hubertus Braunkohlen“.  
36 Denkschrift Hannoversche Bank vom 24. March 1914 (HADB K16/68) 
37 Moral, Aktienkapital, p. 45. 
38 Letter Sal Oppenheim to Rasquin, 5. December 1911, Sal. Oppenheim jun. & Cie. File "Farbwerke 
Rasquin". 
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depending on the individual contract. As described above, banks took responsibility for 
the successful placement of a firms’ IPO. This process did not always work in the same 
way. We can distinguish four forms of contracts, which mainly differ in the way risks 
and profits were shared between issuer and underwriters:39  
First, banks sold the share on behalf of the firms (“Begebungskonsortium”). 
Here banks did not invest their own capital, and the issuer kept the whole risk. Second, 
the underwriter bought all shares from the owner at a certain price – which was mostly 
above par size.40 In this “Übernahmekonsortium” the banks carried the whole risk, but 
also gained the spread between the price paid to the issuer and the offering price. A 
third form of contract was the “Garantiekonsortium”; this was a mixture between the 
first two cases. Here the underwriters sold the shares on behalf of the issuer, but 
guaranteed to buy unsold shares at a fixed price after a short period. Another mixed 
form was the “Optionskonsortium”. In this case, the underwriter consortium bought a 
certain amount of shares and further obtained the option of buying the remaining shares 
later.  
The decision which of these contract types was chosen depended on individual 
negotiations between underwriter and firm owners. It can thus only be reconstructed on 
the basis of the original contract, which has only occasionally been preserved. Thus we 
cannot calculate exactly how high the short run profits of the large banks were. 
However, they were dependent on the offering price and the first trading price, since the 
bank would not offer the shares at a price below they had paid to the issuer.  
Fixing the offering price was a strategic decision. If the offering price was relatively 
high, the bank could gain – depending on its contract with the firm owner and the other 
                                                 
39 Burhop, Die Kreditbanken, p. 199. 
40 Typically, shares were quoted in percent of par size. The usual par size of a share was 1,000 Mark.  
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underwriters - through arbitrage between the difference of the offering price and the 
price they paid to the firm owner.41  
If, on the other hand, the price was too high, they might not sell all shares – implying a 
substantial liquidity risk for the underwriter. Furthermore they would jeopardize the 
trust of their consumers if the offering price was too high and could not be justified by 
the firm’s performance in the following months and years. This negative effect for the 
reputation of a firm would harm future issues.42 Thus they might have had an interest in 
providing “fair deals” to investors – similar to J.P. Morgan in the US. 
According to Riesser, the offering price was generally between the price paid to the 
issuer plus interests, stamp tax, provision and an appropriate profit margin, and the 
prices of similar firms which were already listed on the stock market and were expected 
to perform similarly. 43 He does not, however, discuss or describe what was expected to 
be an ‘appropriate’ profit. 
I will illustrate the way how the offering price was determined in a process of 
negotiations using the IPO of Thörl that I discussed above. The IPO took place in 1908 
at the Berlin stock exchange. Lead underwriter was Deutsche Bank - and the “house 
bank” was Hannoversche Bank, the very same banks had already in 1906 organised the 
incorporation of the firm into a joint stock company. Both owned shares of the firm. 
Deutsche Banks suggested a price of 155 in the first place, expecting an “appropriate” 
first day return for their customers, which would have been about twelve percent, since 
the first price on the market later turned out to be 174. 44 With a higher price, they 
                                                 
41 Moral, Aktienkapital, p. 48 
42 Ibid., p. 49 and Schmalenbach, ‘Emissionstechnik’, p. 80. 
43  Riesser, Die deutschen Großbanken, p. 291. 
44  Letter 30. July 1908 Deutsche Bank to Hannoversche Bank: „Bei 14% Dividende würde sich ja auch 
noch bei etwa 160/165 eine angemessene Verzinsung ergeben, aber unsere Kundschaft soll verdienen und 
darum scheint mir ein Kurs zwischen 150 und 155 angemessen. Wir brauchen ja vielleicht nicht unseren 
ganzen Bestand aufzulegen, sondern können dann, wenn der Kurs, was hoffentlich kommt, steigt, 
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feared a loss of reputation and thus possible investors in the future, especially 
considering that industrial papers became more attractive at the time.45 However, since 
they also owned shares, their own profit would also increase by selling at a lower price 
and thus generating high initial returns. Hannoversche Bank claimed this price was too 
low, suggesting that Friedrich Thörl, the former owner of the firm and the main share 
holder, would not agree to it since he had just bought shares from the consortium at a 
price of 167.5 and stating that Berliner Handelsgesellschaft would probably issue the 
IPO at a price of 210.46 Deutsche Bank could not enforce its price and the offering price 
was finally fixed at 170.47 The way how Hannoversche Bank - the “house bank” of the 
owner of the firm - threw in the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and its possibly much 
higher offering price supports the hypothesis that the competition between the large 
banks and their groups kept the initial returns low. 
To summarize: The offering price in the case of Thörl was fixed in a negotiation 
process which was influenced by the concern of Deutsche Bank to loose its reputation, 
the influence of Friedrich Thörl, the main share holder, the profit interests of 
Hannoversche Bank, which, since it did not sign the issuing prospectus, did not face a 
loss of reputation and finally the market competition by the Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft.  
                                                                                                                                               
successive weiter verkaufen.“ (HADB 1733). The first market price (174) was taken from Berliner 
Börsenzeitung  1. November 1908. 
45  Letter Deutsche Bank Berlin to Deutsche Bank Hamburg 1. October 1908: “…, denn der Einführungs- 
bzw. Subskriptionskurs ist derjenige, auf welchen die einführenden Banken für alle Zeiten hin festgelegt 
und verantwortlich gemacht werden. Dazu kommt, dass wir gerade jetzt in einer Periode zu stehen 
scheinen, in welcher das Publikum sich wieder lebhafter für Industriepapiere zu interessieren scheint; und 
es wäre auf der einen Seite ein gar nicht gut zu machender Fehler, wenn die Zeichner der Aktien bei 
einem hohen Emissionskurs und etwaigen Weichen des Kurses vor den Kopf gestoßen werden, und 
andererseits ein Stimulus für das Publikum, sich auch bei späteren Emissionen zu beteiligen, wenn der 
Zeichnungskurs nach der Subskription in die Höhe geht.“ (HADB S 1733). 
46 Letter Hannoversche Bank to Deutsche Bank 30. July 1908 „ein Kurs unter 170 wäre eine 
Diskreditierung der Sache und würde Thörl zum Todfeind machen. Thörl selbst hat im Konsortium 
kürzlich Aktien zu 167,5% gekauft. Die Handelsgesellschaft würde das Papier zu 210 herausbringen.“ 
(HADB S 1733). 
47  Letter Hannoversche Bank to Deutsche Bank 6. October 1908. (HADB S 1733). 
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The phenomenon that the offering price is rather low and that we can observe a positive 
difference between the offering price and the first trading price, i.e. positive initial 
return, is called “underpricing”. As shown above we cannot draw conclusion about a 
banks short run profit based on underpricing, since they might have bought the share 
from the owner at a lower price and would thus leave “money on the table”. On the 
other hand a low or a negative initial return must not necessarily mean that the banks 
gained high short run profits, since they might own a large amount of the shares 
themselves and would thus benefit from high initial returns. 
However, if underpricing was low and furthermore not significantly different for the 
large banks at the top of the market in contrast to other banks, the hypothesis of an 
oligopoly that faced price competition which reduced the possibilities to extract short 
run profits is supported.  
To calculate and compare the Initial returns for the IPOs and whether they differ 
significantly for the large banks, I reduce the sample to the IPOs issued at the Berlin 
stock exchange, for which one can find the first trading price in Berliner Börsenzeitung. 
This reduces the sample to 202 IPOs. All other IPOs were either introduced at a 
provincial stock market or were introductions48, where the initial returns would be zero. 
Weigt49 shows that for shares that were listed on more than one German stock market, 
the price differences were very small. Thus arbitrage possibilities were very limited and 
the capital market within Germany can be considered as relatively well integrated. Thus 
the Berlin stock exchange can be treated as representative for all stock exchanges within 
Germany. 
                                                 
48 In this period another way of going public can also be observed. Instead of offering the shares before 
the first day of trading, it was also possible introduce the shares to the market (“freihändig”), which 
means they were traded from the first day without a period where banks and private customers could 
apply for shares. See Moral, Aktienkapital, p. 49-50. 
49 Weigt, Der Deutsche Kapitalmarkt‘, pp. 191. 
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Underpricing it is then calculated as follows: 








=
offering
offeringfirst
p
ppIR - , where pfirst is the price at the first trading day50, poffering the 
offering price.51  
Furthermore, since for the period analysed here a high frequency stock market index for 
the Berlin stock exchange is available, we are able to compute market adjusted initial 
returns, which are calculated as follows: 








=
offering
offeringfirst
A
A-A-IRIRm , where Afirst is a stock market index at the day before the 
first trading day, and Aoffering the same index on the first trading day of the IPO. The 
index consists of 27 randomly chosen firms that were consistently listed and traded on 
the stock market in Berlin and weighted with their value.52 It is not an index of IPO 
firms, and thus might cause a slight bias. However, it still corrects for general market 
cycles.  
Underpricing was first documented and analysed on modern markets,53 but it has 
also been observed on historical stock markets, where it seems, however, to have been 
much less pronounced. In modern markets underpricing averages about 15 percent in 
the USA,54 Germany55 and France.56 By contrast, for the Berlin Stock exchange Burhop 
                                                 
50 The number of days between the issue and the first day of trading is in most cases below a period of 14 
days. Sometimes, however, it lags a couple of month. Qualitative evidence from correspondence between 
banks provides evidence that the date reported in the Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen 
Reichs is often much earlier than the actual date when the lead underwriter started to offer the shares. I 
therefore keep all IPOs in the sample, although sometimes the number of days between the issue and the 
first day of trading exceeds 14 days. Running the regressions with different sub-samples, however, does 
not change the results. Regressions are available on request. 
51 See Burhop, ‘Underpricing’; Weigt, Der Deutsche Kapitalmarkt; Chambers and Dimson, ‘IPO 
Underpricing‘. 
52 Taken from Gelman and Burhop, ‘Taxation’. 
53 See Stoll and Curley, ‘Small business’; Logue, ‘On the pricing’; Reilly, ‘New issue investors’; 
Ibbotson, ‘Price performance’. 
54 Ritter and Welch, ‘A review’. 
55 Ljungqvist, ‘Pricing‘. 
18 
 
documented an underpricing of 5 percent for the period from 1870 to 189657 as does 
Weigt58 for the period between the 1880s and World War I. Chambers and Dimson59 
found no underpricing in the first half of the 20th Century and a 10 percent jump in 
underpricing after World War II on the London stock exchange.  
Table 2 shows the average initial returns of all IPOs as well as for the oligopoly of large 
banks treated as one group.  
 
 (Table 2 about here) 
 
Overall underpricing was relatively low with only about three to four percent. The 
median underpricing was even lower with only about one to two percent. Short run 
profits deriving from underpricing seem to have been low; investors did not earn quick 
money by getting particular “fair deals”. Thus they got no reward for the high risk of 
IPOs, which further supports the hypothesis of perceptible price competition on the 
stock market which kept the overall risk low.  
Furthermore, large banks seem to have had no signalling effect for short run profits in 
contrast to the suggestions of the qualitative evidence. On the first view it looks as if the 
average underpricing for the larger banks over the whole period was indeed 
significantly higher. However, by splitting the initial returns into the average initial 
return in four sub-periods it becomes apparent that this difference is driven by the 
period between 1898-1901, where the difference is driven by outliers, since the median 
                                                                                                                                               
56 Biais, ‘IPO mechanism‘. 
57 Burhop, ‘Underpricing’. 
58 Weigt, Der deutsche Kapitalmarkt. The data set includes all IPOs issued in Berlin that were still traded 
in 1914.  My data set includes all IPOs. 
59 Chambers and Dimson, ‘IPO Underpricing‘. 
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in this period did not significantly differ between large banks and others.60  However, 
since underpricing is influenced by many other factors I run a simple OLS regression in 
order to extract whether underpricing was significantly different for the large banks. 
There are a number of recent theoretical approaches trying to explain underpricing for 
modern markets.61 Some of them suggest that reputation of the lead underwriter 
influences underpricing systematically. The classical paper by Rock suggests that 
asymmetric information about the quality of an IPO among different groups of investors 
can induce underpricing.62 If the demand from the group of informed investors is 
insufficient to buy the whole issue, uninformed investors will have to be attracted. 
Informed investors buy high-quality issues only, whereas uninformed investors buy a 
mix of high- and low-quality issues. Realizing this, banks have to compensate 
uninformed investors by offering them all issues at a lower price. This implies that 
banks with a better reputation may not need to offer systematically below the actual size 
and thus that IPOs issued by those banks should have lower initial returns than others.63 
Empirical research does not provide a clear answer as to whether one should expect 
lower or higher underpricing for IPOs that were issued by banks with a high reputation. 
Beatty and Welch find that the relationship depends on the time period. Before the 
1990s, they find that the relationship between underwriter prestige and underpricing 
was negatively correlated, whereas it was positively correlated in the 1990s.64 Chambers 
and Dimson (for Britain) and Burhop (for Germany) test the impact of reputation on 
                                                 
60 However, pricing strategies seem to have varied between the banks. A. Schaaffhausen’scher 
Bankverein had quite a large average underpricing with nearly six percent whereas Dresdner Bank had a 
rather low underpricing of only about one percent. This further contradict the hypothesis that the banks 
were acting like a bank cartel. 
61 See Ritter and Welch, ‘A Review’ for an overview of the literature. 
62 Rock, ‘Why new issues’. 
63 Carter and Manaster, ‘Underwriter Reputation’. 
64 Beatty and Welch, ‘Issuer expenses’.  
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underpricing in their sample of historical markets, but find no clear evidence that banks 
with higher reputation had lower or higher underpricing.65  
Surely there are further empirical and theoretical investigations about other 
factors besides reputation that influence underpricing. However, most of these theories 
require date that are unavailable in an historical setting.66 Given the limitations of 
historical data, to control for other influences I add the same control variables as 
Burhop67, the most comprehensive study of the underpricing phenomenon using 
historical data for Germany. 
In order to catch information asymmetries which according to Rock can induce 
underpricing, I include firm specific variables such as size of an issue (total value of all 
shares), the age of a newly listed corporation68 and the profit in relation to the book 
value (current accounts) in the year before the IPO.69 This data were taken from 
Salinger Börsenhandbuch, a stock market manual and Handbuch der deutschen 
Aktiengesellschaften (Handbook of German joint-stock companies). The economic 
intuition here is that large and old firms provide more information than small and young 
firms. Therefore, more information is available for all investors, the problem of 
asymmetric information among different groups of investors becomes less important 
and underpricing declines. Generally Rocks hypothesis is supported for modern U.S. 
data70. For Germany the evidence is not that clear. Ljungqvist71 reports a positive and 
                                                 
65 Chambers and Dimson. ‘IPO Underpricing‘ and Burhop, ‘Underpricing’. 
66 The optimal IPO mechanism proposed by Biais et al. ‘Optimal’ requires information about the supply 
and demand for a certain issue; the model proposed by Green ‘Presidental’ requires knowledge about the 
distribution of the issue between institutional and retail investors. See Burhop ‘Underpricing’, p.6. 
67 Burhop ‘Underpricing’. 
68 Firm age is the number of days from the foundation or newly incorporation of a firm as a joint stock 
company and the day of the IPO. Because of the retention period of one year the lowest possible age 
should be 365. There are, however, still some firms with a lower number of days before they went public, 
which obviously had a special permission. See §§ 39, Deutsches Börsengesetz 1896. 
69 Rock, ‘Why new issues’. 
70 Kennedy et al. ‘Test of asymetric’ and Michael and Shaw ‘Pricing’ 
71 Ljungvist ‘Pricing’ 
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significant correlation between the size of an IPO and initial returns, whereas 
Wasserfallen and Wittleder72 do not find a correlation. In a historical setting, neither 
Burhop73 nor Weigt74 can find a significant relationship between size of an IPO and age 
of a firm and underpricing. 
Another theoretical explanation for underpricing is based on asymmetric information 
between issuer and investor. If the issuer knows more about the issue than the investor, 
a classical lemon problem emerges and the issuer should underprice the IPO to signal its 
quality. If the issuers use costly underpricing as a signal, they are more likely to 
subsidize this by having a larger SEO later.75 This has been rejected for modern as well 
as for historical data.76 Our measure to test this theory is a dummy that is equal to 1 if 
there was an SEO within 5 years at all and the size of the SEO placed during five years 
after the IPO divided by the size of the IPO. To support this hypothesis, the coefficients 
are supposed to be positive and significant. 
Another hypothesis for which I control is the market sentiment hypothesis. As Burhop 
points out, contemporaries hypothesised that the general economic and political climate, 
as well as the liquidity of the financial market, influenced the success of IPOs.77 
Empirical studies using modern U.S. and German data also support a positive 
correlation between past performance of the stock market and initial returns.78 This can 
also be observed in historical settings: Weigt reports positive correlation between the 
performance of the stock market index during the year preceding the IPO and initial 
                                                 
72 Wasserfallen and Wittleden ‘Evidence’ 
73 Burhop, ‘Underpricing’, for the period 1870 to 1896. 
74 Weigt, Der deutsche Kapitalmarkt. The data set includes all IPOs issued in Berlin in the period 1882 to 
1913 that were still traded in 1914.  My data set includes all IPOs. 
75 Grinblatt and Hwang, ‘Signalling’; Allen and Faulhaber, ‘Signalling by underpricing’; Welch, 
‘Seasoned Offerings’. 
76 Kennedy et al., ‘The implications’; Michaely and Shaw, ‘The pricing’; for the 1870 to 1896: Burhop, 
‘Underpricing’. 
77 Burhop, ‘Underpricing’.p. 8 and Lotz Die Technik, p.44 and Moral Aktienkapital. 
78 Loughran and Ritter ‘Why has’ Lowry and Schwert‘IPO pricing mechanism’ and Ljungqvist ‘Pricing’. 
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returns for her sample of long-living firms and so does Burhop for the period 1870 to 
1896 I also control for past market returns by adding the average market return of the 
previous year.  
In summary I estimate the following OLS- regression:79 
εβββ ++++= returnPastmarketxbankcIRm ii 321 , 
where the dependent variable IRm is calculated as shown above. The variable “Bank 
accounts” for the dummy variables for the Big Six as lead underwriter and Big Six as 
member of the consortium of underwriters banks, vector xi of firm specific explanatory 
variables accounts for observable characteristics attached to the IPO, in particular the 
size of the IPO, the days since incorporation (age), size of SEO relative to the size of the 
IPO, dummy whether there was an SEO within 5 years, profits in percent of current 
accounts of the year before the IPO.  
Table 3 provides the regression results. Regressions 1 and 3 are based on a 
sample of all IPOs issued in Berlin. Regressions 2 and 4 are based on the IPOs of 
sample 1, where I could find additional firm information.80 Overall, all models are 
significant. The r-squared is rather low in all regression- explaining only up to eleven 
percent of the variability of the market adjusted initial returns, but this is similar in 
comparable studies.81 None of the explanatory variables, however, is significant. This, 
again, is very similar in comparable studies.82 
                                                 
79 It is theoretically possibly to estimate a two-stage model that accounts for the possible endogeneity oft 
he bank variable.  Since the IR variable is multivariate and assumed to have an extreme-size distribution 
and the potentially endogenous variable is binominal, the error distributions are incompatible. This 
complicates the implementation of instrumental variables. Even if an instrumentabl –variables procedure 
can be implemented, however, the difficulty of correctly specifying the structural equations often renders 
two-stage-models estimates untrustworthy in practice. Fohlin, Financial Capitalism, p.255.  
80 Firm specific information was not available for all firms in the sample. I also ran the regression for the 
reduced sample without the firm specific variables and the results remained unchanged. The results are 
available upon request.  
81 See for instance Burhop, ‘Underpricing’. 
82 Ibid. 
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In general the regressions confirm the descriptive statistics. The initial returns of the six 
largest banks are not significantly higher or lower. Large banks did not offer particular 
“fair deals” or by selling a relatively high prices raised their own profits.  
As seen above, the offering price was determined as a negotiation process between firm 
owner and involved banks. The fact that underpricing was low and not different for the 
banks with the highest market shares provides evidence that the possibilities to offer 
particular “fair deals” to investors or to extract high underwriter premiums were 
strongly restricted by the competition between the largest banks. Furthermore, as in the 
case of “Thörl”, regional “house” banks may have negotiated on behalf of the owners of 
the firms trying to get sound deals for their long time customers. Another explanation 
might be that all IPOs at the time had a very good quality due to the high regulation of 
the IPO market or that the potential investors at the time were all very well informed.   
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
The signalling function in the longer run 
 
As shown above, large banks dominated the market but investors did not get higher 
benefits trough higher underpricing. Did the fact that one of the Big Six underwrote an 
issue signal to investors that the firm would perform well in the future? Carter, Dark 
and Singh, for instance report for modern markets that the excess performance of IPOs 
underwritten by higher quality investment banks is better in the long run, not 
necessarily on the first day.83 
                                                 
83 Carter, Dark and Singh, ‘long- run performance’. 
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There is strong evidence that large banks were perfectly aware of the fact that they 
associated their name with the IPO and that its performance had an impact on their 
future reputation: As Deutsche Bank stated on one occasion in 1906, „[i]f we introduce 
this issue, our name represents the incorporation and we must vouch for the shares until 
they stop being traded.84 According to Moral, a contemporary expert, the bare fact that a 
large bank managed the IPO of a firm raised trust in the firm.85 He further cites another 
contemporary observer, Waldemar Müller who argued that a bank, which issued a 
share, would be made morally responsible for the future fate of this firm.86   
Banks had two ways to ensure that the IPO performed well: First by carefully choosing 
well performing and promising firms in the first place and second by monitoring and 
supervising corporate managements.87 Qualitative evidence indicates that large banks 
were evidently not prepared to issue the IPO of each and every firm. They were careful 
in making a right judgment about whether to take responsibility of the IPO of a certain 
firm. Although launching SEOs, granting loans and organising mergers would allow 
them to benefit from relationships with less profitable firms, too. They seem to 
generally made sure the firm was sufficiently profitable, which supports De Longs 
Argument also for the German case that banks had to make sure they did not lead its 
clients into unsound deals in order to keep the reputation which they needed to maintain 
market power88: They employed relatively independent audit companies to inspect firms 
                                                 
84 Letter Deutsche Bank to Hannoversche Bank 30 April 1906: „Führen wir dieses Papier ein, so decken 
wir mit unserem Namen die Gründung und haben vor der Welt die Aktien zu vertreten und für sie 
einzustehen, solange sie überhaupt eine Notiz haben.“ (HADB K16/123). 
85 Moral, Aktienkapital, p. 13 
86 Müller, ‘Die Organisation‘, p. 119. 
87 However, we do not have the information whether the large banks were for instance members of the 
control board of the firms that they underwrote. This extensive data work must be left to future research. 
However, monitoring and supervising corporate managements were an accepted part of German  financial 
history. See for instance De Long ‘Morgans’s men’, p. 228. Thus it is very likely that this was also the 
case for the firms where the large banks were lead underwriter or part of the underwriter consortium. 
88 De Long ‘Morgans’s men’, pp. 232,233. 
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before an IPO and sometimes did their own research, demanding detailed reports on 
balance sheets and information on profits.  
The most established and known instrument for banks to gain information about the 
firms was the Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft, which was founded by Deutsche Bank in 
1890 and became the first official auditing company in 1901. This company established 
a complete new service within the German economy with providing independent 
experts testimony about the performance and liquidity of firms, which was very 
successful. With the success of the Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft it became 
worthwhile for many banks to own or co-own in an auditing company. In 1910 many 
important banks such as Darmstädter Bank and Berliner Handelsgesellschaft were 
shareholders of Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft and had a representative in the 
supervisory board. The Discontogesellschaft founded its own Revisions- und 
Treuhandgesellschaft in 1905. 89  
Their own research on the credibility and performance of the firms was often clearly 
organised. The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, for instance, had detailed guidelines about 
how to check the credibility and performance of industrial firms (see Table 4). The 
guidelines were broken down into five dimensions. First, the geographical 
circumstances had to be evaluated. Then, special circumstances of the firm were 
assessed. This point covered production methods, patents, technology compared to that 
used by the main competitors of the firm, dependence on skills of workers, machines or 
special apparatus. The third area of inspection focused on the administration and 
management of the firm, its structure, design and efficiency. The fourth covered money 
and profits in detail, evaluating cost, capital and investment and the last covered other 
                                                 
89 Dahlem, ‘Die Professionalisierung’, pp. 95-102, 159, 190. 
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factors that influenced performance such as history of the firm and dependency on the 
owner.90  
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Deutsche Bank was similarly careful in choosing firms. In the case of Thörl, Deutsche 
Bank made sure that the firm had performed sufficiently well in the previous years. 
Apart from the commercial inspection by their - for this purpose founded - Deutsche 
Treuhandgesellschaft they further insisted on a technical inspection by an independent 
expert.91 The branch of the Hannoversche Bank also provided a detailed report about the 
development of the firm, of its profits since 1886 and its latest balance sheet and 
development possibilities similar to the guidelines of Berliner Handelsgesellschaft 
above. They even characterized the personality of the owner (highly intelligent, 
trustworthy and hardworking).92  
In another case, where Hannoversche Bank again was the local bank and Deutsche Bank 
the lead underwriter, launching the IPO of “Harburger Eisen- und Broncewerke AG” 
(“Harburg Iron and Bronze Works”) in October 1912 at the Berlin stock exchange, 
Hannoversche Bank also provided detailed reports on the liquidity and performance of 
the firm with a special mention of their long term business relationship with this firm, 
                                                 
90 Memo Dr. Rathenau 27 July 1906 “Grundsätze für die Prüfung industrieller Unternehmungen”. R 8127 
/ 14069. 
91  Letter Deutsche Bank to Hannoversche Bank: „Die Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft veranschlagt für 
die Prüfung 1.000 Mark. Neben dieser kaufmännischen Prüfung soll auch eine technische Prüfung 
erfolgen.“  Harburg 30-April 1906. (HADB K16/123). Hannoversche Bank replied to Deutsche Bank: 
„Mit der Illationsgründung und Prüfung durch technische Sachverständige ist man einverstanden.“ 1 May 
1906. (HADB K16/123). 
92  Letter Hannoversche Bank to Deutsche Bank 1. May 1906: „Herr Thörl ist ein hoch intelligenter und 
rühriger Fabrikant und Geschäftsmann, der das, was er geschaffen hat, seiner eigenen Kraft, seinem 
Unternehmungsgeist und seiner Tüchtigkeit verdankt. Ursprünglich widmete er sich dem Studium der 
Chemie, gelangte aber schon bald zu eigener Selbständigkeit, wobei er sich nicht allein als gewiegter 
Geschäftsmann, sondern auch als kluger und fähiger Fabrikant erwies.“ (HADB K16/123).  
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which would make a successful IPO likely.93 “Hubertus Braunkohlen AG zu Brüggen” 
(“Hubertus Lignite Inc., Brüggen), was inspected by a mining expert, who was an 
employee of Deutsche Bank, before they agreed to underwrite the IPO.94  
The Diskontogesellschaft generally only issued IPOs of large firms. In a letter to Sal 
Oppenheim, which was the local bank in this case, about a possible issue of “Farbwerke 
Raquin” (see above), they stated that they would not usually issue IPOs of firms with an 
equity capital of only 1.5 Million Marks, but that they would (and eventually did) if the 
firm had potential for growth, of which they demanded conclusive evidence in form of 
the last closing account, the report of the chamber of trade written on the occasion of the 
foundation of the company, inspection by the Treuhand and more information about the 
market for the type of oil colours which Rasquin produced.95  
Apart from these criteria for adequate business performance of firms, some banks 
preferred firms from specific sectors. The reason might have been that they gained 
sector specific insights which made it easier to judge about the performance of a firm 
from this sector. As table 5 shows, most IPOs at the time - and therefore largely 
represented in the portfolio of every bank – were issued by industrial firms (metals 
working and machines producers). However, most of the large industrial firms were 
issued by the large banks. Regional stock exchanges show a greater variability of 
sectors and a lower concentration on the large industrial firms. Here a large number of 
                                                 
93 Letter Hannoversche Bank to Deutsche Bank 6. December 1910: „Die langjährige Kenntnis der Firmen 
und die ausführliche Prüfung des Geschäfts lassen einen erfolgreichen Börsengang erwarten.“ (HADB 
K16/112). 
94 It was not stated directly what the expert („Bergassessor Pohl“), was supposed to do. But the context 
makes clear that this way Deutsche Bank tried to ensure they would underwrite a firm which would 
performs well in the following years. Letter Deutsche Bank to Sal Oppenheim 19.3.1910; Letter Sal 
Oppenheim to Deutsche Bank 21. March 1910, Sal. Oppenheim jun. & Cie. File "Hubertus Braunkohlen 
AG in Brüggen". 
95  Letter Discontogesellschaft to Sal Oppenheim 9. August 1911 Sal. Oppenheim jun. & Cie.File 
‘Farbwerke Rasquin’ 
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smaller businesses covered in sector “other”, which includes for instance sectors such as 
construction, food and beverages and trade can be observed. 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
 
Banks also concentrated on regions as illustrated in figure 2. The figure shows the 
headquarters of the firms that went public in the period from 1896 from 1913 by lead 
underwriter for the six largest banks. Deutsche Bank as well as for instance Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft issued shares of firms that were spread over the entire country, with 
main centres in the most industrialized regions, such as the Rhineland, Saxony, 
Hamburg and Berlin. However, Dresdner Bank preferred Saxony, in particular the 
vicinity of Dresden, where it was founded. Darmstädter Bank had its centres of attention 
around Frankfurt and Darmstadt, where it was founded, and in Cologne. 
Diskontogesellschaft was most active in the western provinces of Prussia, in the area 
around Cologne and the Ruhr, and in East Germany, but not at all in the south of 
Germany. A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein, who kept it’s headquarter in Cologne, 
also had its strongholds in Cologne and the Ruhr area. 96 
 
(figure 2 about here) 
 
In summary it seems as if the large banks were careful in choosing the most promising 
firms. Thus, despite the absence of a signal on the first day (underpricing) we would 
expect one can observe a signalling effect of the large banks in the first year after the 
IPO. 
                                                 
96 See Footnote 14. 
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At a first glance, figure 3 shows that this was obviously not the case. The figure 
compares the market to book values one year after the IPO and the profit per book value 
in the year of the IPO for 373 IPOs, where the information was available. We would 
expect to see that firms whose IPOs were issued by one of the Big Six would have 
higher profits per book value or higher market to book values, but there is no significant 
difference between them.97 
 
(figure 3 about here) 
However, maybe the performance within the first year was still better or less volatile. 
Long run returns for each of the twelve months after the IPO are calculated with the 
following equation98: 
( )
it
it p
ppRR it1ti -+= , where pt is the closing price of month t for issue i. 
Figure 4 provides the cumulated raw returns for the whole sample by sector for the Big 
Six and the other banks. The returns for the Big Six are for most sectors slightly above 
the returns of the IPOs issued by other banks. A significant difference can only be 
observed for Railways and Textiles. However these IPOs made only about eight percent 
of the overall value of all IPOs issued by the Big Six (see table 5). The IPOs of the 
sector which mattered most – Machines and Metal working performed – similarly.  
                                                 
97 This does not change if we break the figure into the four sub-periods, include Dividents and 
‘Stueckzinsen’- a typical feature of the German stock market (Figures are available on request). 
98 Carter et al. , ‘Underwriter reputation’. have documented the relation between long-run performance of 
IPOs and underwriters on modern markets and have shown that the underperformance of IPO stocks 
relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious 
underwriters.  For the USA between 1975 and 1984, Ritter, ‘The long-run performance’ reports on 
average 29 percent underperformance compared to other issues for the first three years.  However, other 
scholars such as Gomber and Lerner,‘The Really Long-Run Performance’., who examines US IPOs over 
a much longer time period US (1934 to 1972) find no underperformance.  However, since we are only 
interested in the difference of the performance between the Big Six and others, I focus on the IPO 
performance  by bank and not compared to the entire market. 
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Most returns fell slightly after about four month. This indicates possible price support in 
the first months. This was, however, not only legal, it was expected as a responsibility 
of the underwriter to take “care and attention” of price losses caused by short run 
speculation on the initial returns. It was not supposed to artificially increase the price. 99  
(figure 4 about here) 
Another measure of long run performance is the Sharpe ratio or reward-to-variability 
ratio.100 This is calculated by dividing the return for the first year by the variability of 
the monthly returns. The higher the Sharpe ratio, the higher is the return per risk and the 
better is the investment. Table 6 shows the results of a simple OLS regression with the 
Sharpe ratio as dependent variable. I control for firm specific variables, past market 
returns, different sectors and time. In summary I estimate the following OLS- 
regression:101 
                                                 
99 Riesser, Die deutschen Großbanken, p. 294. By studying the correspondence between underwriter 
consortia, one can find much qualitative evidence of this kind of price support in the first time after the 
IPO. The Hubertus Braunkohlen AG in Brüggen for instance, was introduced at the Berlin stock exchange 
in July 1910 at the offering price of 150 percent of its par size by Deutsche Bank and Sal Oppenheim. In a 
letter from July 1910, Sal Oppenheim informed Deutsche Bank that they traded shares with a total size of 
51.000 Mark in the first month of the IPO in order to keep the price stable. Letter Sal Oppenheim 
Deutsche Bank 7. July 1910: „Am 7.7. wurden zudem 51.000 ge- und verkauft (Kurspflege).“ Sal. 
Oppenheim jun. & Cie. File "Hubertus Braunkohlen AG in Brüggen". In a letter from Hannoversche 
Bank in Harburg to Hannoversche Bank in Hannover about the shares of Harburger Eisen- und 
Broncewerke, the branch informed its head quarters that the former CEO moved to Berlin, shortly after 
the IPO and his retirement. He further admitted to have sold shares of 40.000 Mark to Dresdner Bank – a 
direct competitor, without informing the underwriter consortium. The branch warned its headquarter 
against possible price losses. Letter Hannoversche Bank Harburg to Hannoversche Bank Hannover 
15.8.1913 (HADB K16/112). In the case of Farbwerke Rasquin, however, there is a hint that the motive 
for price support was not only to make up for the effects of short run speculation. This issue was 
introduced by Diskontogesellschaft and Sal Oppenheim in Berlin in February 1912. In mid-February the 
Diskontogesellschaft suggested to raise the price in the coming days in order to increase investor’s 
interest in the issue. However, again stabilization only lasted for a short period. Up to the end of 
February, they stabilized the price every day and thereafter only some days in March. Letter 
Diskontogesellschaft to Sal Oppenheim 14.12.1913 Sal. Oppenheim jun. & Cie. File “Farbwerke 
Rasquin”. 
100 Sharpe, ‘Mutual Fund Performance’ 
101 As for the previous regressions (underpricing), tt is theoretically possibly to estimate a two-stage 
model that accounts for the possible endogeneity oft he bank variable.  Since the Sharpe ratio is 
multivariate and assumed to have an extreme-size distribution and the potentially endogenous variable is 
binominal, the error distributions are incompatible. This complicates the implementation of instrumental 
variables. Even if an instrumentable –variables procedure can be implemented, however, the difficulty of 
correctly specifying the structural equations often renders two-stage-models estimates untrustworthy in 
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εβββ ++++= returnPastmarketxbankcSharpe ii 321 , 
where the dependent variable Sharpe is the Sharpe ratio calculated as discussed above. 
The variable “Bank” for the dummy variables for the Big Six as lead underwriter and 
Big Six as member of the consortium of underwriters banks, vector xi of firm specific 
explanatory variables accounts for observable characteristics attached to the IPO, in 
particular the size of the IPO, the days since incorporation (age) and profits in relation 
to the book value in the year of the IPO.  
Similar to the other quantitative evidence, there is no significant difference for IPOs 
issued by the Big Six and other banks. Significant are only firm-specific variables, such 
as profit per book value or firm age, which are positively correlated with the Sharpe 
ratio.  
In summary, neither in the short run nor within a one year period any signal to investors 
from the fact that one of the Big Six was lead underwriter or a member of the 
underwriter consortium can be observed. 
 
(table 6 about here)  
 
Conclusion 
It seems established that Gerschenkrons Hypothesis that the peculiar character of 
Germany’s financial institutions played a critical role for her industrialisation and for 
the fact that Germany overtook England in the late 19th century was true for the first 
                                                                                                                                               
practice. Fohlin, Financial Capitalism, p.255. Furthermore, the regressions are used to test under control 
wether the Sharpe ratio was significantly different for the IPOs issued by the six largest banks compared 
to others.  
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three quarters of the 19th Century.102 In the late 19th century the stock market more and 
more replaced loans as a major source of capital for industrial firms. According to 
recent research by Burhop there is no evidence that large banks could transfer their 
influence from the market for loans to the stock markets in the early phase of the stock 
market from 1870 to 1896.103  
In this paper, I investigate the question whether the strong position of the large German 
banks became perceptible on the stock exchange only after 1896. This would imply that 
they still played a critical role for firms to overcome liquidity constraints and thus for 
Germany’s industrialisation. And indeed, the first section of the paper provides 
qualitative and quantitative evidence that large prestigious banks were indeed important 
in the process of going public on the German stock market in the period from 1896 to 
1913. However, the six largest banks, did not seem not operate as a cartel and the 
evidence suggests that in contrast to the stock market in the US, there was perceptible 
competition on the German stock market keeping short run profits and fees low.  
The paper also provides evidence that there is another group that strongly benefited 
from the IPO business: local banks. They could gain from the underwriter business even 
if they did not have the market power to do it on their own, if they had well established 
business connections with the large banks in Berlin. They had reliable information 
about local firms to offer, accumulated through long term business relationships over 
many years and sometimes personal acquaintance with the owner, which was valuable 
information for the large banks. Good business relationships between firms and banks, 
and well established bank networks in the IPO business constituted a system in which 
all involved banks and firms benefited. 
                                                 
102 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, and Europe in the Russian Mirror.  
103 Burhop, ‘Aufsichtsräte’ and Burhop, ‘Underpricing’. 
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Another interesting finding is the absence of a signalling effect to investors. 
Neither the initial returns were higher for IPOs issued by the Big Six nor did they 
perform better than IPOs issued by smaller banks in a one year period. Thus, although 
the German IPO business was in the hands of a small oligopoly, investors did not 
benefit from the lack of competition. This does not necessarily mean that investors were 
the losers of the system. Since the stock market strongly developed, investors must also 
have benefited. This could be due to the overall high quality of IPOs on the German 
stock market at the time which was partly caused by the competition between 
underwriters, who all tried to build up a good reputation by carefully choosing 
promising firms. More likely, however, is the hypothesis from a recent working paper 
by Burhop, Chambers and Cheffins that the tight regulation of the German stock market 
ensured the high quality of all firms on the stock market. They show that IPOs 
performed similar to the market and that almost none of the firms that went public at the 
end of the 19th century was delisted within five years of the IPO.104 
 
                                                 
104 Burhop, Chambers and Cheffins, ‘Regulation’. 
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF BANKS ACTING AS LEAD 
UNDERWRITER AND THEIR CUMULATED MARKET SHARE OF COMPLETED 
IPOS 1897-1913 
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Note: own calculations, data from Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 1897-1913 
 
FIGURE 2: HEADQUARTERS OF FIRMS BY LEAD UNDERWRITER 
  
  
  
Note: data from Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 1897-1913) 
FIGURE 3: RELATIVE PRICES AND EARINGS OF FIRMS THAT WENT PUBLIC; 
BETWEEN 1897 AND 1913 
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Note: own calculations, data from Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 1897-1913, Salinger 
Börsenhandbuch 1896 to 1913. 
 
FIGURE 4: CUMULATED RAW RETURNS FOR THE SIX LARGEST BANKS AND 
ALL OTHERS FOR THE ONE YEAR AFTER THE IPO BY SECTOR 
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Note: Own Calculations, Data from Berliner Börsenzeitung 1896-1913. 
 
TABLE 1: AVERAGE MARKET SHARES IN PERCENT IN NUMBERS OF IPO AND IN SIZE (VALUE) OF IPO (ALL STOCK 
MARKETS) 
  Market share in number of IPOs Market share in number of IPOs including bank groups 
Underwriter 1896-1913 1898-1901 1902-1905 1906-1909 1910-1913 1896-1913 1898-1901 1902-1905 1906-1909 1910-1913 
A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein 4.69 6.64 3.59 5.84 1.41 4.69 6.64 3.59 5.84 1.41 
Darmstädter Bank 3.55 2.37 5.39 3.65 4.23 3.84 2.37 5.39 5.15 4.23 
Deutsche Bank 9.38 3.79 8.38 14.60 16.20 10.38 3.79 8.98 17.65 17.61 
Direktion der Diskontogesellschaft 3.13 1.90 1.80 3.65 5.63 7.82 2.37 7.19 10.29 15.49 
Dresdner Bank 5.68 3.79 7.78 6.57 7.04 5,69 3.79 7.78 6.57 7.04 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft 4.12 3.32 5.39 5.84 3.52 4.12 3.32 5.39 5.84 3.52 
All large banks 30.54 21.80 32.34 40.15 38.03 36.54 22.27 38.32 51.47 49.30 
Herfindahl index 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 
                      
  Market share in size of IPOs Market share in size of IPOs including bank groups 
Underwriter 1896-1913 1898-1901 1902-1905 1906-1909 1910-1913 1896-1913 1898-1901 1902-1905 1906-1909 1910-1913 
A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein 7.54 11.70 3.97 6.55 2.51 7.54 11.70 3.97 6.57 2.51 
Darmstädter Bank 9.36 5.70 13.74 17.42 3.56 9.51 5.70 13.74 18.05 3.56 
Deutsche Bank 18.80 12.75 12.12 24.81 29.68 19.46 12.75 12.43 26.55 30.77 
Direktion der Diskontogesellschaft 5.78 2.96 1.62 7.15 11.44 8.49 3.21 5.61 9.67 17.14 
Dresdner Bank 6.42 6.86 10.21 5.73 5.03 6.42 6.86 10.21 5.74 5.03 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft 7.83 5.21 14.39 12.37 2.51 7.83 5.21 14.39 12.37 2.51 
All large banks 55.72 45.17 56.05 74.02 54.72 59.24 53.90 62.86 78.83 61.51 
Herfindahl index 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.14 
Note: own calculations, data from Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reich
 
TABLE 2: AVERAGE AND MEDIAN INITIAL RETURNS AND MARKET ADJUSTED INITIAL 
RETURNS FOR THE SIX BANKS AND THEIR BANK GROUPS  
 
    Initial returns (IR) Market 
adjusted Initial 
returns (IR_m) 
Initial returns 
(IR) 
Market 
adjusted Initial 
returns (IR_m) 
     
 1896-1913   Big 6     
 others     
 1898-1901   Big 6     
 others     
 1902-1905   Big 6     
 others     
 1906-1909   Big 6     
 others     
 1910-1913   Big 6     
 others     
 
Note: Difference between the large banks and others have been tested using a simple ttest and a Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney U two-sample test.  Significance at 5% level are indicated with a) and b) respectively. 
TABLE 3: REGRESSION RESULTS UNDERPRICING 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Market adjusted Initial return 
     
Big Six (Lead underwriter) 1.018 0.973   
 
 
(1.15) (1.02)   
Big Six (Underwriter consortium)   1.025 0.801 
 
 
  (1.18) (0.85) 
Size of the issue (standardized) -0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.010 
 
 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) 
Size of SEO in % of IPO 0.033 -0.014 0.036 -0.017 
 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) 
SEO within 5 years=1 0.299 0.509 0.319 0.516 
 
 
(0.22) (0.38) (0.24) (0.39) 
Past market return 5.786 7.274 5.858 7.382 
 
 
(1.11) (1.25) (1.13) (1.27) 
Days since incorporation (st.)  -0.000  -0.000 
 
 
 (1.32)  (1.25) 
Profit per book value  in year of IPO  0.405  0.390 
 
 
 (0.89)  (0.87) 
Constant -30.744 -41.045 -31.122 -41.596 
 
 
(1.15) (1.34) (1.16) (1.36) 
Time fixed effects1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202 181 202 181 
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.10 
F 3.17 3.06 3.16 3.06 
F>P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
   
                                                 
1 To reduce the number of dummy variables, time fixed effects were period fixed effects: 1896-1913, 1898-1901   
1902-1905, 1906-1909 and 1910-1913. 
2 To reduce the number of dummy variables Textiles, Chemicals, Metal working and Mining were treated as one 
group (Industry) in the regressions. 
TABLE 4: GUIDELINES ABOUT HOW TO CHECK THE CREDIBILITY AND 
PERFORMANCE OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMS (BERLINER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT) 
A. Area    
  Economic needfulness 
Size of the sales territory, possibilities to expand, dependency 
on exogenous factors (business cycles, state of technology) 
  Raw materials 
endowment, availability, dependency on exogenous factors 
(harvest) or speculation (cotton) 
  
Position on the World 
market 
favoured countries of production, export, imports, tariffs, 
transport possibilities, storage stability 
B. Special conditions   
  Position of the firm 
Access to raw material, sales territory and labour market, train 
stations, river and canals, distance to the sea. 
  Methods of production 
Patents, methods, state of technology compared to 
competitors, Possibilities of new competitors based on 
technology, labour force and machines 
  Factory 
Value in relation to business volume, Usability in the case of 
technological improvements. 
  Work force 
Number and quality of workers, wages, productivity, workers 
organisation, number of strikes 
  Raw materials 
price and quality, necessity to store, variability of prices, all 
compared to competitors, conditions of payment, Monopolies, 
Trusts, Dependency on subcontractors, ratio of raw material 
prices to final product prices. 
  Sales 
market conditions, demand, quality of the products, compared 
to competitors, influence on prices, competition from abroad, 
export, competing products, sales territory. 
Table 4: continued 
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
Source: Memo Dr. Rathenau 27 July 1906 “Grundsätze für die Prüfung industrieller Unternehmungen”. 
R 8127 / 14069. 
 
TABLE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF IPOS ON DIFFERENT SECTORS IN PERCENT FOR THE 
SIX LARGEST BANKS AND ALL OTHERS  
 
  
   1896-1913   1898-1901   1902-1905   1906-1909   1910-1913  
    
 
Large 
Banks   others  
 
Large 
Banks   others  
 
Large 
Banks   others  
 
Large 
Banks   others  
 
Large 
Banks   others  
  Berlin only 
Si
ze
 o
f I
PO
s 
 Banks   16.5  4.9  22.2  2.9  0.0  6.6  2.1  4.8  23.8  
 Chemicals  6.0 4.2  0.0  0.5  2.9  3.1  3.2  9.4  20.4  10.0  
 Machines, Metal working  34.1 20.3  53.5  15.1  30.7  14.5  30.4  15.2  26.3  36.9  
 Mining  12.4 8.8  2.4  11.0  4.1  21.3  20.3  5.0  19.4  0.0  
 Textiles  3.9 5.9  0.0  9.5  3.2  3.9  3.8  5.0  9.3  2.4  
 Others  32.5 38.4  25.0  30.5  51.3  49.5  34.5  63.3  19.8  26.9  
 Railroads  4.7 5.9  14.1  11.2  4.7  7.7  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  
  Regional stock exchanges 
Si
ze
 o
f I
PO
s 
 Banks   8.0  0.0  18.2  6.4  6.6  45.0  3.9  0.0  2.1  
 Chemicals  7.5 10.1  21.2  4.0  5.4  19.0  5.4  7.7  0.0  15.1  
 Machines, Metal working  11.8 25.6  0.7  21.5  11.5  25.4  10.0  38.5  26.2  24.6  
 Mining  3.5 4.9  3.7  0.0  3.8  17.2  1.9  1.2  5.4  4.0  
 Textiles  7.4 4.9  0.0  6.2  14.9  5.5  5.2  4.9  10.0  3.5  
 Others  52.8 43.1  74.4  46.1  58.1  24.1  32.6  43.9  58.4  45.1  
 Railroads  0.0 3.4  0.0  4.0  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.7  
 
Source: own calculations, data from Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 
 
TABLE 6: REGRESSION RESULTS SHARPE RATIO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 
 
Sharpe ratio 
Big six (Lead underwriter) 0.005 0.005   
 
 
(0.58) (0.50)   
Big six (Underwriter consortium)   0.005 0.005 
 
 
  (0.58) (0.51) 
Size oft the issue -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
 
(1.37) (0.78) (1.38) (0.78) 
Past market return -0.098 -0.073 -0.097 -0.073 
 
 
(1.89)* (1.33) (1.88)* (1.32) 
Days since incorporation (st.)  0.000  0.000 
 
 
 (5.98)***  (6.03)*** 
Profit per book value in the year of IPO  0.010  0.010 
 
 
 (1.76)*  (1.76)* 
Constant 0.485 0.357 0.483 0.355 
 (1.79)* (1.22) (1.78)* (1.21) 
 
Time fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 276 258 276 258 
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18 
F 3.78 9.17 3.81 9.08 
p>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
 
 
FZID Discussion Papers 
 
Competence Centers: 
 
IK:   Innovation and Knowledge 
ICT:   Information Systems and Communication Systems 
CRFM:   Corporate Finance and Risk Management 
HCM:   Health Care Management 
CM:   Communication Management 
MM:   Marketing Management 
ECO:   Economics 
SE:   Sustainability and Ethics 
 
Download FZID Discussion Papers from our homepage: https://fzid.uni-hohenheim.de/71978.html 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
01-2009 
 
Julian P. Christ 
 
NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY RELOADED: 
Localized Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation 
 
 
IK 
02-2009 André P. Slowak MARKET FIELD STRUCTURE & DYNAMICS IN INDUSTRIAL 
AUTOMATION 
 
IK 
03-2009 Pier Paolo Saviotti 
and Andreas Pyka 
 
GENERALIZED BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
04-2009 Uwe Focht, Andreas 
Richter, and Jörg 
Schiller 
 
INTERMEDIATION AND MATCHING IN INSURANCE MARKETS HCM 
05-2009 Julian P. Christ and 
André P. Slowak 
 
WHY BLU-RAY VS. HD-DVD IS NOT VHS VS. BETAMAX: 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF STANDARD-SETTING CONSORTIA 
IK 
06-2009 Gabriel Felbermayr, 
Mario Larch, and 
Wolfgang Lechthaler 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECO 
07-2009 Steffen Otterbach MISMATCHES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREFERRED WORK 
TIME: Empirical Evidence of Hours Constraints in 21 Countries 
 
HCM 
08-2009 Sven Wydra  PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES – ANALYSIS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
IK  
09-2009 Ralf Richter and  
Jochen Streb 
CATCHING-UP AND FALLING BEHIND 
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER FROM AMERICAN 
TO GERMAN MACHINE TOOL MAKERS 
IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
10-2010 
 
Rahel Aichele and 
Gabriel Felbermayr 
 
 
KYOTO AND THE CARBON CONTENT OF TRADE 
 
ECO 
11-2010 David E. Bloom and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOW FERTILITY IN EUROPE 
 
HCM 
12-2010 Michael Ahlheim and 
Oliver Frör 
DRINKING AND PROTECTING – A MARKET APPROACH TO THE 
PRESERVATION OF CORK OAK LANDSCAPES 
 
 
ECO 
13-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör,  
Antonia Heinke, 
Nguyen Minh Duc, 
and Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES – HOW GOOD IS IT REALLY? 
ECO 
14-2010 Julian P. Christ  THE GEOGRAPHY AND CO-LOCATION OF EUROPEAN 
TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC CO-INVENTORSHIP NETWORKS 
 
IK 
15-2010 Harald Degner WINDOWS OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY 
DO TECHNOLOGICAL BOOMS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND INNOVATIVENESS? 
 
IK 
16-2010 Tobias A. Jopp THE WELFARE STATE EVOLVES:  
GERMAN KNAPPSCHAFTEN, 1854-1923 
 
HCM 
17-2010 Stefan Kirn (Ed.) PROCESS OF CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS THROUGH 
eHEALTH 
 
ICT 
18-2010 Jörg Schiller ÖKONOMISCHE ASPEKTE DER ENTLOHNUNG  
UND REGULIERUNG UNABHÄNGIGER 
VERSICHERUNGSVERMITTLER  
 
HCM 
19-2010 Frauke Lammers and 
Jörg Schiller  
CONTRACT DESIGN AND INSURANCE FRAUD: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION  
 
HCM 
20-2010 Martyna Marczak and 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
REAL WAGES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN GERMANY 
 
ECO 
21-2010 Harald Degner and 
Jochen Streb 
 
FOREIGN PATENTING IN GERMANY, 1877-1932 
 
IK 
22-2010 Heiko Stüber and 
Thomas Beissinger 
DOES DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY 
DAMPEN WAGE INCREASES? 
 
ECO 
23-2010 Mark Spoerer and 
Jochen Streb 
GUNS AND BUTTER – BUT NO MARGARINE: THE IMPACT OF 
NAZI ECONOMIC POLICIES ON GERMAN FOOD 
CONSUMPTION, 1933-38 
 
ECO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
24-2011 
 
Dhammika 
Dharmapala and 
Nadine Riedel 
 
 
EARNINGS SHOCKS AND TAX-MOTIVATED INCOME-SHIFTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
 
    ECO 
25-2011 Michael Schuele and 
Stefan Kirn 
QUALITATIVES, RÄUMLICHES SCHLIEßEN ZUR 
KOLLISIONSERKENNUNG UND KOLLISIONSVERMEIDUNG 
AUTONOMER BDI-AGENTEN  
 
ICT 
26-2011 Marcus Müller, 
Guillaume Stern, 
Ansger Jacob and 
Stefan Kirn 
 
VERHALTENSMODELLE FÜR SOFTWAREAGENTEN IM  
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
ICT 
27-2011 Monnet Benoit 
Patrick Gbakoua and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza  
ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO 
28-2011 Nadine Riedel and 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO 
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
 
IK 
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann 
and Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg and 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht 
and Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann and  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid and 
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
    
42-2012 Benjamin Schön and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny and 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid and 
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ and 
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett and Andreas 
Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak and 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann 
und Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan und Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
 
